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Report on the Mission to Validate the Pilot County
Mine Action Plan for Croatia
Summary
The initial proposal to prepare a pilot County Mine Action Plan (CMAP)
proved overly ambitious because a great deal of work was required to
systematically re-survey the areas suspected of landmine contamination and
to compile socio-economic and physical planning data from a variety of
sources. The initial proposal did not envisage the use of Multi-Criteria
Analysis (MCA). MCA (specifically, the PROMETHEE method) was added
about six months after the start of the pilot CMAP exercise, but then became
the core methodology used both to structure the priority-setting problem and
to analyse the data. The pilot project experienced significant delays, but
these were not due to the MCA approach. The principal delay stemmed from
the need to systematically re-survey all suspected minefields in the county,
but this effort also brought significant benefits by reducing the area
suspected of contamination in Sisacko-Moslavacka County from about 800
km2 to about 200 km2.
The MCA methodology eventually was used to address two distinct decisions.
First, which municipalities or cities should receive priority? Second, which of
the suspected minefields (defined by GIS polygons) should receive priority?
For the second decision, two priority rankings were formulated: one from the
perspective of county politicians and the other from the perspective of
municipal politicians.
The pilot CMAP using MCA methodology achieved only partial success. The
effort to rank municipalities and cities in terms of priority appears to have
been successful, but that for ranking specific polygons appears to have been
flawed. The problem in the latter case stems from the difficulty in defining
‘homogeneous’ polygons that can be compared in a valid manner. This led to
the identification of the largest polygons as the priorities, with the result that
more than half the total contaminated area in the county was defined as
priority; an area that appears to be 15-to-20 times larger than will be
certified as safe in 2003 through technical survey and mine clearance.
Therefore, CROMAC had to use its traditional processes to determine the
specific areas within each polygon that will be technically survey and, where
necessary, cleared in 2003.
The pilot CMAP effort also failed to incorporate cost considerations explicitly
into the priority ranking exercise using MCA, or to incorporate community
participation to any significant degree. As a result, the pilot effort in using
MCA methodology can only be adjudged as a very partial success. At the
same time, the MCA approach appears to be very promising. In particular, it
can cope with the ‘hierarchical’ structure of the decisions on mine action
priorities in Croatia: one decision on how to allocate the national budget
among counties; the next on how to allocate a county mine action budget
among cities and municipalities; the third on which polygons should be
priorities. It also can cope with large amounts and different types of data,
and with input from a variety of groups (civil society organisations; interest
groups; etc.). By structuring the problem carefully and by making the

criteria and indicators explicit, MCA also has the potential to increase
transparency. The PROMETHEE MCA method that was utilised also can
cope with large amounts, and many types, of data, which would facilitate the
analysis of the socio-economic impacts of mine contamination and mine
action. In brief, the MCA approach is relevant and offers very significant
potential benefits. The pilot project realised some but not the bulk of these
potential benefits, which is not a surprising result considering the
complexity of priority-setting for mine action. A good deal was learned in the
pilot and the validation team believes many of the shortcomings can be
addressed in the next iteration.

Introduction
This report covers the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of a
mission from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Mine Action
(GICHD) on behalf of the UNDP-Croatia and the Croatian Mine Action Centre
(CROMAC) undertaken from 11-15 November 2002. The purpose of the
mission was to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the methods used to
develop the pilot County Mine Action Plan (CMAC) in Croatia. The mission
team comprised Eric Filippino, Head of the Socio-Economic Unit at GICHD,
and Ted Paterson, an independent consultant.

Objectives and Focus of the Mission
As provided by the Terms of Reference (attached in full as Annex 1), “the
objectives of the validation are to:
•
•
•

assess the relevance and effectiveness of the methodology employed
identify any shortcomings in the methodology
based on the findings, to make recommendations for changes to the
methodology and improvements that should be included within the advice
and guidance to be provided by UNDP …”

The following excerpt from the Terms of Reference served to identify critical
issues (shown in added highlights) on which the mission should focus:
“The pilot plan was intended to serve as a model for the staff of all four Regional
Centres, to create decentralised CMAPs. The model was to be transparent, and
incorporate community involvement and define priorities that took into account
social and economic opportunity costs.”
Therefore, in addition to the assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of
the Multi-Criteria Analysis methodology, the mission team sought to address
the following questions:
•
•
•
•

Was the methodology used in the pilot CMAP transparent?
Does the methodology incorporate community involvement?
Did the methodology identify priorities based, in large part, on socioeconomic considerations?
Does the pilot represent a model that would be suitable for other CMAPs
to be developed in a decentralised fashion by the Regional MACs?

Findings
BACKGROUND
The existing system for developing the national mine action plan and for
identifying priority tasks has evolved over time. In the immediate post-war
period, mine clearance was seen as an integral part of the reconstruction
effort and priorities for survey and clearance were determined by plans for
reconstruction, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and special
projects to upgrade the national infrastructure, clear the Sava River for
navigation, etc. In this sense, mine clearance was ‘demand-led’ in its initial

phases and, in general, the priorities were starkly clear.1 As is normal,
however, the problem of identifying priorities becomes more difficult once the
most obviously pressing problems are addressed.
Following the establishment and build-up of CROMAC in 1998, the first
county demining plans were prepared in 1999 and the national mine action
programme was adopted by the House of Representatives in October 2000.
The annual national plans for demining are basically a compilation of (1) the
county plans, and ‘top-down’ priorities derived from the work programmes of
(2) the central ministries, and (3) the key state-owned enterprises. To some
outside observers, including donors, it was unclear how priorities were being
established within each county, whether politicians in the different counties
were setting priorities based on similar criteria, and the degree to which
socio-economic factors were considered when setting priorities. Accordingly,
a project was proposed to “…improve the County Mine Action Plans up to an
international standard where socio-economic argumentation is used to set
the priorities.’”
THE PROPOSAL FOR THE PILOT COUNTY MINE ACTION PLAN2
The initial proposal was to develop a CMAP to serve as a pilot for other
counties which collectively would form the basis for the national mine action
plan. The plan envisaged a January 2001 start with the pilot county plan
completed in June, followed by the remaining CMAPs and the national plan
by the end of that year.
Six sub-groups were established for the pilot, including one for SocioEconomics that was to “define and execute an impact survey’” and one for
Survey that was to “define and execute survey level II including area
reduction.” Both of these tasks are significant undertakings and it should
surprise no one that the April completion deadline was not achieved.3 As
well, the Socio-Economic Group lacked models for conducting a socioeconomic impact survey to support the production of the pilot CMAC4 or for
analysing the socio-economic data that were collected.5

1

When this is true, priorities often will be ‘objective’ in the sense that different decision-markers –
when presented the same information – would arrive at very similar lists of priority tasks, and outside
observers can readily verify that the tasks undertaken were clear priorities, even if the criteria and
processes used for selecting these tasks are not completely explicit.
2
Quotations in this section are from Project Plan: County Mine Action Plan, version 6 February 2001.
3
The Survey Group did not conduct a level II (or technical) survey as it is traditionally understood in
the mine action field. Rather, it conducted what might be termed a ‘systematic resurvey’ to update data
on each suspected hazard in the CROMAC database. In doing so, it was able to reduce the area
suspected of contamination within Sisak-Moslavacka County from about 800 km2 to 200 km2.
4
The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) methodology developed by the Survey Action Center is designed
to collect socio-economic impact data for setting priorities, but such surveys are major undertakings
and beyond the scope and budget of the Pilot CMAC Project. As well, the LIS methodology has not yet
been used in a more developed environment such as Croatia, in which very significant amounts of data
are available. Other socio-economic studies of mine action have been designed to demonstrate the
feasibility and importance of socio-economic analysis for mine action; not to produce a roadmap for
systematically incorporating socio-economic data into the planning and priority-setting processes.
5
In the end, a socio-economic survey was not undertaken. Instead, socio-economic and other data were
obtained via the County Institute for Urban Development, the Bureau of Statistics, and various
ministries.

THE PILOT APPLICATION OF MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS
The original plan for the Pilot CMAP made no mention of Multi-Criteria
Analysis (MCA). This approach was incorporated about the middle of 2001
when Mr. Nenad Mladineo from the University of Split was engaged as an
advisor, using funding provided by CIDA.6 Mr. Mlanineo and a two-person
team of GIS specialists devoted about three months over the remainder of
2001 on the pilot CMAP effort.
The specific MCA methodology used is termed Preference Ranking
Organisation METHod for Enrichment Evaluations (PROMETHEE). Like any
decision theory methodology, it first requires a thorough understanding of
the problem so a model can be formulated for analysis. After a series of
discussions with CROMAC, Mr. Mladineo identified the following problem
characteristics:
•
•
•

Mine clearance is extremely expensive, so resource constraints preclude
the clearance of all, or a significant proportion, of the contaminated area
in the short- to medium-term;
There are many different groups affected by the contamination, and their
interests are in many cases in conflict (i.e., each group would select
different areas for priority clearance);
There is a hierarchy of decisions. For mine action in Croatia, the problem
of allocating mine action assets can be separated into decisions
concerning how much to provide [i] for each county (termed the ‘strategic
decision’ in the documentation), then [ii] for each municipality within a
county (tactical decision), and finally [iii] for clearance of specific hazards
within a municipality (operational decision).

Concerning the last point, as the pilot project was to prepare a county MAP,
the exercise embraced only the ‘tactical’ and ‘operational’ decisions. Thus, we
can define:
•
•

Decision 1: how to allocate the available county budget across the cities
and municipalities (hereinafter, municipalities).
Decision 2a: how to allocate the available municipal budget to clear
specific hazards.

Structuring the exercise in this manner implies that county officials divide at
least some of the mine action budget among municipalities, and then let the
municipal officials determine which hazards to clear. Of course, it is
conceivable that county officials could bypass the municipal officials and
select which hazards to clear on a county-wide basis.7 In this case, there
would be a single decision at the county level, as follows:
6

We understand the contact with Mr. Mladineo initially was made by a member of the CROMAC
Scientific Council, and that the proposal for funding was submitted to the Canadian Embassy in Zagreb
in the winter of 2001. We understand the original proposal was to use MCA for ‘backward
engineering’ analysis (i.e., to analyse what criteria were used in selecting priorities for clearance in the
past), but this was abandoned in favour of using all the funds in support of the pilot CMAP effort.
7
While the pilot project envisaged greater input from civil society groups, it recognised that “setting of
priorities is a task for the politicians.” (Project Plan: County Mine Action Plan, version 6 February
2001, Annex 3, Section 3.3)

•

Decision 2b: how to allocate the available county budget to clear specific
hazards.

The following table summarises the three decisions.
No.
1
2a
2b

What is being decided
Resources allocated to each municipality.
Resources allocated to each hazard.
Resources allocated to each hazard.

Who decides
County
Municipality
County

The problem must then be defined, which requires defining the alternatives
(e.g., hazards which could be cleared) and formulating the criteria and
indicators8 to guide decision-makers in selecting – or giving priority to –
some alternatives rather than others.
The alternatives for decision/problem 1 are the 11 municipalities. For
decisions/problems 2a and 2b, the CROMAC team used the ‘systematic
resurvey’ work done by the Survey Group to define 72 polygons of suspected
contamination, which served as the alternatives.
Concerning the criteria, the following are listed in The County Plan of
Demining Priorities for Sisako-Moslavacka County on the Basis of Multicriterial
Analysis (hereinafter, The MCA CMAP):
•
•
•
•
•

Humanitarian consequences;
Reconstruction;
Economic growth;
Technical-technological parameters;
Ecological parameters. (The MCA CMAP, p. 4)9

Typically, criteria are phrased in fairly broad terms. This is important to
ensure people are clear of the true goals (e.g., to reduce the physical danger
to the settled and returning populations) thus avoiding an overly narrow
focus on, say, clearing the maximum number of square metres. However, it
is difficult to determine in an objective or consistent fashion how well the
programme is performing relative to a broadly defined criterion. Indicators
are ways to measure or assess how much an alternative (i.e., a possible
clearance task) satisfies a criterion. For example, ‘agricultural land’ might be
used as an indicator of economic growth potential; similarly ‘past landmine
accidents’ might be an indicator for the ‘humanitarian consequences’
criterion.

8

The documentation on the pilot CMAP does not distinguish clearly between the terms ‘indicator’ and
‘criterion.’ Nevertheless, the distinction is important and the international development community
typically puts great store in ‘objectively verifiable indicators’, so we will employ the term clarify for
donors some of the potential links between MCA and the analytical approaches used in planning,
managing, and evaluating aid projects.
9
However, it is unclear the degree to which each of these criteria featured in the pilot exercise: in
particular, the ‘technical-technological parameters’ seem not to have been integrated into the analysis,
it is unclear how ‘reconstruction’ differs from ‘economic growth’, and it is unclear how ‘humanitarian
consequences’ was addressed.

It appears that three distinct problems – corresponding to the three
decisions listed above (1, 2a, 2b) – were defined as part of the pilot exercise:
Problem 1: How to allocate the available county budget across the cities and
municipalities? The alternatives are the 11 municipalities within SisakoMoslavacka county. The criterion was ‘humanitarian consequences’ as
measured by an index of ‘objectively estimated risk’ facing the populations
within each of the municipalities. The list of indicators used to calculate the
index appears to have included at least the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The area (square metres) of land suspected of contamination;
The ratio of contaminated land10 to the total area of the municipality;
The numbers of people living within or adjacent to the contaminated
land;
The numbers of people living within 100 metres on either side of
infrastructure (roads etc.);
Landmine and UXO accidents;
Expected returns.

This analysis led to the following priority ranking of the cities and
municipalities:11
1. Sunja
4. Dvor
7. Dubica
10. Kostanjnica

2. Petrinja
5. Glina
8. Novska
11. Gvozd

3. Jasenovac
6. Sisak
9. Topusko

For problems 2a and 2b, Mr. Mladineo worked with CROMAC and County
personnel to construct lists of indicators (i) that were relevant to the various
criteria and (ii) that could be measured objectively with the data available
(much of which was in GIS format) or otherwise ‘valued’ by relevant experts
(e.g., CROMAC personnel, county officials, ICRC representatives). Over 20
indicators (The MCA CMAP refers to these as ‘categories’) were used in the
pilot effort (See Appendix 2).12
Various groups (county officials, municipal officials, etc.) then were asked to
assign weights to the different indicators to provide a gauge of how
important each type of land or infrastructure was deemed to be by the
members of that group. This then allowed the calculation of a ‘value’ or
‘score’ for each alternative (hazard polygon) using the PROMETHEE
methodology, following which the alternatives could be ranked in terms of
their ‘score’.13
10

For ease in exposition, we will use the phrase ‘contaminated land’ in place of the more correct but
unwieldy ‘land suspected of contamination.’
11
In fact, different versions of this index were calculated. CROMAC seems to have placed most weight
on the percentage of land area within each municipality that is contaminated (see The MCA CMAP,
Table 1, p. 15). Some other documents focus on the numbers of people within a contaminated area.
(Choosing the optimal policies for risk reduction in mine contaminated areas, p. 4 and p. 6)
12
Some of these indicators were dropped as they were relevant for only one municipality.
13
PROMETHEE is one of a broader family of ‘outranking’ approaches. Outranking is based on the
systematic comparison of each alternative against each of the other alternatives (termed ‘pairwise
comparison’) for each criterion. In loose terms, if alternative A is at least as good as alternative B for

In the pilot study, two rankings for the hazard polygons were generated: one
using the criteria weights of the county officials and the second using those
of the municipal officials. There was significant congruity between the
polygons identified as priorities by county- and municipal-level officials, but
a few differences were apparent, as depicted in the following table:
Polygon #

Municipality

Municipal Ranking (only
polygons in municipality)
1
2
3
4

County Ranking (all
polygons in county)
1
5
9
10

B67
B66
B68
B28

Sunja
Sunja
Sunja
Sunja

B20
B23
B24
B21

Petrinja
Petrinja
Petrinja
Petrinja

1
2
3
4

2
4
8*
7*

B10
B14

Glina
Glina

1
2

23*
11*

B26

Sisak

1

3

B06

Dvor

1

6

B37
Jasenovac
1
20*
B48
Jasenovac
3
17*
* County ranking order differs from municipal ranking order.
Data obtained from The MCA CMAP, Table III, pp. 20-21, and Table IV, p. 22.
The fact that some of the priority rankings were different for county and
municipal officials is not surprising. For example, officials in one
municipality might give scant weight to mine clearance in support of flood
control measures if these serve to protect a downstream municipality, but
county officials would have to consider the wellbeing of citizens in both
municipalities. One of the potential strengths of a number of the MCA
approaches – including PROMETHEE – is in the clear identification of those
alternatives (e.g., hazard polygons) for which the priority ranking does
change as a result of the different weightings. The ‘conflicts’ are, therefore,
made concrete and can be discussed to see if they can be resolved or at least
narrowed. We understand however that this was not done during the pilot
project. Instead, CROMAC and/or county officials decided on the following
approach:
•

Some demining would be done in each of the eleven municipalities in
2003;

the majority of criteria, and is not significantly worse than alternative B on any other criterion, then
alternative A is said to ‘outrank’ alternative B. The authors do not have sufficient background in
Operations Research to evaluate the PROMETHEE method, but did obtain a number of academic
papers and case studies which indicate that the methodology is widely accepted and has been used for
the analysis of many complex problems, particularly in the field of environmental management.

•
•

Within each municipality, some part of the municipality’s highest priority
polygon would be cleared;14
The remaining demining resources would be allocated according to
county-level priorities.

CROMAC officials used the above rules, plus the findings from the MCA
analysis, to generate their proposed Mine Action Plan for 2003 for SisakMoslavacka County.15

Conclusions
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
First, it must be emphasised that Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) is properly
viewed as a decision-support system rather than decision-making system.
Elected politicians have the legal responsibility and authority to make
decisions concerning mine action priorities in Croatia. Such decisions
benefit from the recommendations proffered by mine action officials, and
such recommendations should be based on thorough analysis. MCA
promises to enhance such analysis to support – but not replace – the
recommendations and final decisions.
Second, while CROMAC is not the first to employ MCA for mine action (the
Survey Action Center uses an MCA approach in generating priorities from its
Landmine Impact Surveys), the pilot CMAP project entails a number of
important innovations. A more sophisticated MCA methodology is employed
(PROMETHEE) to take advantage of the far greater amount of socioeconomic, demographic, ecological, and other data available in Croatia. An
MCA specialist was engaged as a consultant to assist CROMAC personnel in
the pilot effort. A sophisticated software programme (Decision Lab 2000) was
used to facilitate the analysis. The priority-setting process was properly
diagnosed as a hierarchical system of decisions.
Third, as is to be expected in a pilot effort featuring a number of innovations,
both CROMAC personnel and Mr. Mladineo were on steep ‘learning curves’.
Together, they have found solutions to some – but not all – of the problems
in harnessing MCA for mine action planning, and have reaped some – but
not all – of the benefits from this approach. In particular:
• The results obtained depend on significant amounts of parallel or
preparatory work being done (systematic re-surveys; collection of data).
Much of this work is valuable in its own right, but it represents a
substantial effort;
• Some technical problems were not fully resolved in the pilot (definition of
polygons);
• The pilot did not embrace the strategic decision-level (how resources
should be allocated among Croatia’s counties) and did not apply MCA to

14

Many of the 72 polygons were extremely large – some over 35 million m2. Clearance of the entire
polygon would be infeasible in such cases as the annual clearance capacity in Croatia is only 30 million
m2 or less.
15
CROMAC officials had also decided to tender larger clearance tasks for 2003 in recognition of the
high mobilisation costs faced by demining contractors.

•
•
•

the lowest-level decision (i.e., determining how much and which parts of
the high priority polygons will be demined in 2003);
Time did not allow for the involvement of a full range of civil society
organisations and interest groups (farmers, tourism businesses, etc.) in
the pilot process;
The set of criteria and indicators are not yet fully developed, and overlaps
among indicators may mean that certain types of benefits are being
counted/weighted more than once;16
As pilot project, the on-going effort required to benefit from the use of
MCA for planning and priority-setting is not reflected in organisational
structure of CROMAC.

The major problem at this point appears to be the definition of the polygons.
For the PROMETHEE system to work properly, these should be
‘homogeneous’, but the 72 defined polygons are not: for example, polygons
vary in size between 38,445,502 m2 and 2,812 m2. The way the
PROMETHEE methodology was applied also made it far more likely that the
largest polygons would be identified as priorities, as depicted on the graph
below.17
Distribution of Polygons by Size
80%
70%
% of total

60%
50%
40%
30%

All polygons

20%

Priority polygons

10%
0%
< .1

.1 to 1

1 to 5

over 5

Area in square km

This appears to the validation team to be a flaw in the methodology as it was
applied in the pilot. The ranking seems to reflect the total score of all the
‘valued things’ (i.e., items covered by the indicators used) within each
polygon – regardless of size – rather than the score per square metre. It
should surprise no one that a polygon of 20 million m2 scores higher in
absolute terms than one of 200,000 m2. But the first polygon would also cost
perhaps 100 times as much to demine. Put another way, priorities should be
set based on the ratio of benefits to costs, but the pilot study seems to have
identified the polygons promising the largest benefits without giving any
consideration to the costs. We believe this apparent flaw can be corrected.
16

For example, there are separate indicators for ‘forests’, ‘national parks’, ‘nature reserves’, and
‘hunting areas’. If national parks and nature reserves are largely forested, then the value of forests is
essentially being counted three times. Similarly, if hunting areas are largely forested, we may have a
similar problem of multiple counting.
17
We are unsure whether this is due to (1) the likelihood that larger polygons would contain more
‘valued things’ (i.e., items covered by the indicators used), (2) the likelihood that larger polygons
would contain larger amounts of any particular ‘valued thing’ (e.g., agricultural land), or both.

TRANSPARENCY
MCA increases transparency in some important ways. It requires that
criteria and indicators are made explicit, along with the weightings attached
to these by various groups. All these could be reported upon and
independently verified. It imposes a far more structured and systematic
process, the adherence to which also could be verified. It also highlights
conflicts between priority rankings of different groups, setting the stage for
discussions to illuminate the underlying reasons for these conflicts (i.e.,
different interests in one form or another). As well, the MCA process
generates a reasonably clear priority ranking of the polygons. If politicians
decided that one or more polygons not on the MCA priority list should be
demined, then audits or evaluations could focus on those specific polygons
and the reasons they were selected. More fundamentally perhaps, once there
is more community involvement in the MCA process (see the discussion on
community involvement, below), civil society organisations and interest
groups are likely to be better informed and in a position to exercise more
effective oversight of local politicians than is presently the case.
However, the MCA methodology was not employed for the entire prioritysetting process (i.e. all the decisions in the hierarchy). In particular, it was
not used for determining which specific areas within the priority polygons
would be demined. This is an extremely important point, in part because (as
noted above) the MCA methodology was applied in a manner which led to the
identification of the largest polygons as priorities. The 11 priority polygons
on the ‘county list’ comprise over 148 square km, or 68 per cent of the entire
contaminated area in the county. Croatia’s total clearance capacity is less
than 30 square km/year. Assuming 5 square km might be cleared in
Sisacko-Moslavacka in 2003, only about three per cent of the so-called
priority area will in fact be cleared in the coming year. Even if area reduction
via further surveys is included, only a small percentage of the ‘priority’ area
will be released for safe use in the coming year. This leaves ample
opportunity for selecting certain land for clearance based on nontransparent criteria. We understand the MCA methodology could be used to
restructure the priority-setting ‘problem’ so that more tightly targeted areas
would be selected for priority attention, and this should be attempted in the
next iteration.
The use of a methodology such as MCA also has the potential to diminish
transparency for two reasons, both of which can be addressed. First, the
results obtained depend on experts and the techniques are not easily
grasped by politicians and members of the public. There is a requirement for
a clear overview written for the layman if people are to have faith in the
results. Second, the results are generated in a more-or-less mechanical
fashion from the data and from the weightings assigned to the indicators.
There is a possibility that the data or (less likely) the weightings could be
altered or manipulated by someone reasonably familiar with the process to
skew the results for private or political gain. Thus there is a need for a
periodic audit to insure the integrity of the system.
THE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

While the pilot plan envisaged significant involvement from community
organisations and interest groups, this did not materialise for the most part.
This omission seems to be the result of time pressures and resource
constraints, as the MCA approach is well suited for community involvement.
This would be most readily achieved by having community organisations and
interest groups provide their weightings for the indicators and, perhaps,
suggest additional indicators. Different weightings are likely to generate
different priority rankings, and the natural next step would be follow-up
meetings to analyse the specific conflicts and attempt to arrive at a
compromise that would garner consensus support. This process would then
provide the foundation for greater community oversight of the entire mine
action planning and priority setting process.
THE UTILISATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA
MCA has the capacity to incorporate significant amounts of socio-economic
data, thus generating priorities based on socio-economic impacts. The pilot
effort did draw upon some socio-economic data (demographic, agricultural
land, infrastructure) but further work required to capture these potential
benefits more completely. The most important step is to extend the analysis
on basis of cost-benefit logic, which requires the introduction of the cost side
of the equation.18 Additional improvements would then come from drawing
upon more data. For an obvious example, agricultural land could be broken
down by quality and supplemented by crop data.
It must be stressed at this point that not all CROMAC officials appeared
convinced of the importance of incorporating socio-economic analysis into
the priority setting process. In part this may stem from the recognition that
priorities ultimately will be established by elected politicians. However, we
understand the political directorate has, for the most part, endorsed the
recommendations put forward by CROMAC, so it is important that these
recommendations are geared to achieving the maximum socio-economic
benefit with the available resources.
The apparent lack of concern may also stem from Croatia’s commitment to
eliminate the impact of mine contamination by the end of 2010 – all the
important hazards will be cleared within the next eight years, so why spend
time and money refining the priority-setting process? To our knowledge, no
cost-benefit analysis of mine clearance has been done in Croatia, so it is
difficult to quantify the benefits of proper priority-setting. But studies done
in other mine contaminated countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina,
suggest these benefits are very large. Given that mine action expenditures
will need to be in the neighbourhood of US $1 billion by 2010 according to
The National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of Croatia, the difference
in economic benefits between optimal and mediocre targeting of mine
clearance is likely to be some tens of millions of dollars – Appendix 3
contains a simple analysis designed to get a rough feel for the sums at stake.
18

This does not imply that all indicators must be valued or measured in financial terms, which would
reduce the problem to a single criterion. Rather, the analysis needs to incorporate both benefits
(however measured) and costs. Even on the cost side, while most will readily be measured in financial
terms, at least some indicators could be valued in some other fashion. For example, the danger of
demining accidents causing deaths or injuries to deminers is one of the costs of mine clearance.

With a potential economic payoff in the tens of millions of dollars, it is
important to invest in approaches that might improve the priority-setting
process.
THE POSSIBILITY FOR DECENTRALISED IMPLEMENTATION
MCA is, in principle, quite suitable for decentralised application. However,
the regional MACs and county authorities should be supported by dedicated
staff in CROMAC headquarters. For the next round of CMACs at least,
additional support from an MCA expert such as Mr. Mladineo would also be
required.
OTHER ISSUES
MCA very well suited for hierarchical resource allocation problems. It would
be possible to apply MCA to the national-level ‘strategic’ decision (i.e., how to
allocate Croatia’s total mine action budget among counties, central
ministries, and state-owned enterprises) before all the county MAPs are
completed.19
MCA also appears to have significant potential for application in other mine
affected countries – initially those possessing significant amounts of data
(e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina) but potentially, more generally.

Recommendations
First, CROMAC personnel and others involved in the pilot project should
prepare an explicit proposal for continuing the effort to harness MCA for
mine action planning and priority-setting and submit this to CROMAC
management. This proposal should address organisational issues (e.g.,
staffing requirements for a central unit responsible for supporting the
preparation on CMAPs by the regional MACs and county authorities);
requirements for outside expertise; a plan and schedule for phased
introduction into the other counties;20 budget requirements (including the
costs of data acquisition); etc. As well, the proposal should incorporate the
following objectives for building on the partial success of the pilot project:
•
•
•
•

19

Devising a better way of defining the alternatives than the polygons of
suspected contamination;
Incorporating indicators of mine action costs so priority rankings reflect
the expected costs as well as the potential benefits;
Obtaining input from civil society organisations and interest groups;
Incorporating additional indicators and obtaining the socio-economic
data needed to quantify or value these;

Indeed, it might be easier to apply the approach at this level as counties form a homogeneous set,
whereas polygons as defined in the pilot study do not.
20
CROMAC does not appear to have the capacity to introduce the MCA approach in all the other
mine-contaminated counties in the next phase as the prerequisites – a systematic resurvey plus the
collection on significant amounts of socio-economic data – represent a good deal of work for each of
the counties. As well, the pilot project achieved only partial success, so a proven model does not yet
exist that can simply be replicated in the other counties.

•

Preparation of a document that clearly describes the process of
developing a CMAP and, in layman’s terms, the general features of the
MCA methodology.

Consideration should also be given to modelling the national-level prioritysetting problem: how to allocate the national budget among counties and the
work programmes of central ministries and state owned enterprises?
Second, assuming they approve the proposal, CROMAC management should
decide whether they wish international involvement. We recommend they
should seek some support from international donors, but this should be
structured as a partnership rather than a traditional donor-recipient
relationship: CROMAC will make a significant contribution to the
international mine action effort if it can devise a method to harness the
potential of the MCA approach for mine action planning and priority setting.
Third, assuming CROMAC decides to seek international involvement, UNDP
and donor agencies should give strong consideration to providing support.
Ideally, the Croatian-international partnership would involve GICHD and/or
the Survey Action Center to ensure dissemination of findings and
subsequent replication in other landmine affected countries.
Fourth, to ensure the mine action planning and priority-setting process is
transparent, CROMAC should request Croatia’s supreme audit institution to
devise an audit programme and undertake periodic audits of CMAPs.
Fifth, any system for setting mine action priorities is based on assumptions
concerning what the cleared land will be used for, by whom, and when it will
be put to use. We have no way of determining whether these assumptions
are valid unless post-clearance ‘level 4’ surveys are conducted in a
systematic manner. CROMAC has not conducted level 4 surveys to date. We
recommend that it does so.

Appendix 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE VALIDATION OF THE
METHODOLOGY USED IN THE FORMULATION OF COUNTY MINE
ACTION PLANS IN CROATIA
Background
1.
The nature of the 1991-95 war in Croatia and the resulting mine and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination are well known and documented
although there are no reliable records as to the number of mines laid. At one
time it was thought that 13,000 Km2 were contaminated but this has now
been reduced to about 1,700 Km2.
2.
Fourteen of the twenty-one counties in Croatia are mine
contaminated. The towns of Sisak, Benkovac, Karlovac, Knin, Osijek and
Vukovar, all of which are situated on former battle front lines, are also
affected.
3.
Very few of the minefields were marked when laid. Their subsequent
location and protection from the public has been, and still is, a demanding
requirement. The presence of mines and UXOs in the country is seen as a
significant impediment to public safety, reconstruction and development.
Very little reconstruction is possible without some form of mine action and
many development projects include a mine action component. The World
Bank has allocated specific funds to the necessary mine action support to
reconstruction projects for which it has provided loans.
National Authority
4.
To address the socio-economic impact caused by the widespread
contamination by landmines and unexploded ordnance and to ensure
optimal use of demining resources, the Government of Croatia (GoC) decreed
in February 1998, the creation of a Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC)
to provide a national co-ordination and management mechanism for all mine
action efforts in Croatia and to develop and implement national mine action
plans.
5.
In March 1998, a Decree was passed to establish an inter-ministerial
“Council of the Croatian Mine Action Centre”, consisting of representatives
from eight ministries and a President from the Office of the Prime Minister.
The Council was tasked with approving and monitoring the implementation
of plans and proposals submitted by the CROMAC.
6.
In September 1999 the GoC requested the UN to provide continued
support in terms of advice and technical assistance to the CROMAC to
further develop Croatian capacity to conduct all aspects of mines and UXO
clearance. It was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding that during
the course of 2000 the responsibility of the UN mine action assistance
programme would transfer from UNMAS to UNDP.
7.
CROMAC has formulated the current GoC strategy document (‘The
National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of Croatia’) that was ratified
by the Croatian Parliament in October 2000.

Ottawa Convention
8.
The GoC has signed and ratified the international treaty to ban antipersonnel landmines (the Ottawa Convention) and in 1999, hosted the
Second Regional Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines. CROMAC has
responsibility for implementing the majority of the treaty obligations (mine
awareness & risk reduction education, minefield marking, clearance and
victim assistance), and the Ministry of Defence for stockpile destruction.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the overall responsibility for ensuring
compliance with the treaty and reporting.
Strategic Operational Target
9.
In accordance with its obligations under the Ottawa Convention, the
GoC plans to clear all the mined areas in Croatia by 2010. The current
strategy document indicates that a total of 4,500 Km2 of land is mine
contaminated. Since the document was published, extensive general survey
operations undertaken as a component of a "pilot" County Mine Action Plan
for the Sisacko-Moslavacka County have resulted in a substantial reduction
in the total area believed to be mine contaminated. By extrapolation of those
results to the other thirteen mine affected counties, it is now estimated that
the total mine contaminated land area is 1,700 Km2. As actual general
survey operations are conducted in all mine contaminated counties, a
further reduction in the total area might well be expected.
10.
The ten-year target is nonetheless ambitious and demonstrates the
GoC’s commitment to clear its territory of mines and UXOs. It has committed
substantial state funds and has successfully mobilised funds from other
sources.
CROMAC Capacity
11.
In September 2001, an independent evaluation of the UNDP support
project to CROMAC was undertaken. Among its conclusions, the evaluation
reported:
•

CROMAC’s systems, processes and procedures are well advanced, appear
better than many other governmental institutions in the country and generally
better than most other mine action programmes globally.

•

The magnitude of the mine problem within Croatia (i.e. its impact on the
country) is assessed to have diminished in recent years through appropriate,
cost-effective, and generally well-targeted interventions. Despite this, the
landmine/UXO problem is subjectively assessed as still having a moderatehigh impact on the country and remains a moderate-high priority issue
(relative to other aid/development concerns in Croatia) in the eyes of most of
those interviewed.

12.
•

The Evaluation also reported:
There is insufficient data readily available to determine whether the
effectiveness of mine action activities coordinated/managed by CROMAC (i.e.
the targeting and socio-economic impact of these) has improved or otherwise.
Nonetheless, indicators such as the marked drop in civilian mine/UXO

accidents from some 227 in 1991 to around some 22 in 2000 strongly suggests
that CROMAC (together with all other mine action operators) has been
adequately targeting priority areas. Despite the lack of comprehensive socioeconomic data, the saving of human lives alone (indicated by the drop in
civilian accidents and number of in-ground mines/UXO found and destroyed)
is, in itself, a significant socio-economic achievement.

County Mine Action Plans
13.
CROMAC has four Regional Centres (Sisak / Karlovac / Knin /
Osijek) and as part of its decentralisation plans, responsibility for developing
County Mine Action Plans (CMAPs) has been devolved to the Regional
Centres.
14.
Last year, in conjunction with the University of Split, and with the
assistance of a UNDP project Technical Advisor, CROMAC developed a
methodology for the preparation of a “pilot” Sisacko-Moslavacka CMAP
which utilized social and economic indicators as well as other criteria and
the assignment of specific weights.
15.
The pilot plan was intended to serve as a model for the staff of all four
Regional Centres, to create decentralised CMAPs. The model was to be
transparent, and incorporate community involvement and define priorities
that took into account social and economic opportunity costs.
16.
The methodology for identifying and using socio-economic factors is at
the core of planning and decision making. This has a direct link with utility
of factors considered, targeting of clearance and priorities, which in turn has
a direct influence on related projects, benefits, overall utilization of funds
and return on such costly investments. Therefore the methodology needs to
be validated.

Ongoing UNDP Support
17.
A new project undertaken by UNDP includes objectives, outputs and
activities relating to CMAPs. An extract from the relevant section of the
Project Document is shown at Annex A.
18.
The Senior Technical Advisor for the project has commenced his
appointment in July.
Objectives of the Validation
19.

The objectives of the validation are to:
•

assess the relevance and effectiveness of the methodology
employed

•

identify any shortcomings in the methodology

•

based on the findings, to make recommendations for changes to
the methodology and improvements that should be included within

the advice and guidance to be provided by UNDP outlined at Annex
A.
20.

The main stakeholders are:
The County level government authorities
CROMAC
CROMAC Regional Offices
Population of fourteen mine affected Counties
Mine Action operators in Croatia (international / national NGOs and
commercial companies)
International community and the GoC in their desire to meet Ottawa
Treaty goals and to promote socio-economic development in mine
affected areas of Croatia.

Issues to be addressed
21.
In order to achieve the objectives of the validation, the team members
should address the following issues:
•

Guidelines that may have been prepared by the University of Split
or other material on which criteria for the methodology is based,
including the assessment of the impact of mine contamination on
affected communities, socio-economic analysis of mine action and
priority setting.

•

The status of the pilot Sisacko-Moslavacka CMAP and the other
CMAPs that have since been developed including provision for
monitoring and evaluation

Methodology of the Validation Team
22.
In order to effectively carry out the validation, the following action will
be necessary:
a.

The UNDP Country Office and the project will brief the
validation team immediately on arrival. The project staff and
CROMAC will provide logistical support including coordination
of local transportation, and arrange meetings with appropriate
stakeholders: Where necessary, an interpreter should be
provided.

b.

The validation team will:
•

through CROMAC, compile relevant documentation for review
including County Mine Action Plans, and any guidelines
developed in conjunction with the University of Split.

•

conduct interviews which should include the staffs of
CROMAC and the Karlovac Regional Centre,

County authority which cooperated in the development of the
“pilot” Sisacko-Moslavacka County Mine Action Plan
Academic staff of the University of Split who participated in the
development of the methodology.
Validation Team
23.
The validation team will be composed of two specialists, one of whom
participated as a member of the Core Group in the UNDP sponsored Study of
Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action undertaken by the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in 2000 / 01. The other
should be a person with extensive experience of management of mine action
programmes, and implementing similar methodology.
Time Frame and Conclusions of the Validation Mission
24.
The validation Mission is scheduled to begin on [
]. The total
duration of the mission is one week (10 days?). A meeting with CROMAC,
UNDP, UNOPS and the project should be held at the conclusion of the
mission. Preliminary findings, recommendations and conclusions in the form
of an executive summary should be presented at the meeting. Comments
made, and conclusions resulting from the meeting will be included in the
final draft of the report to be submitted to the UNDP Country Office no later
than one week after the conclusion of the mission.

ANNEX A
EXTRACT FROM PROJECT DOCUMENT

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 2: COUNTY MINE ACTION PLANS
Enhance the ability of CROMAC and regional staff to prepare CMAPs for all mine affected
Counties covering the principal dimensions of humanitarian mine action based on an explicit
set of transparent and measurable criteria in which social and economic considerations
dominate
Success Criteria
A demonstrated and internationally recognised capacity of CROMAC and Regional offices to
prepare CMAPs incorporating an efficient and effective mine action planning and priority
setting process providing CROMAC with a methodology for completing the remaining CMAP
and the means for devolving responsibility to Regional offices. This will result in:
a.

Full understanding of all aspects of mine action and its role in the process of
reconstruction, return and development.

b.

Improved management of prioritisation and planning at all levels within CROMAC,
and jointly with the relevant ministries and county administrations.

c.

Appropriate decentralisation giving practical responsibility
supervising mine action operations to the Regional offices.

d.

A more efficient planning and management capability within CROMAC that operates
in accordance with the socio-economic factors when setting priorities for mine action.

e.

The ability to complete, without further technical assistance, the remaining CMAP.

f.

CROMAC staff, working in co-operation with the international mine action community,
to share lessons learned in the development of regional priorities.

for

planning

and

Output 2.1
Develop the capacity of CROMAC staff, and at all four Regional Offices, to create a model for
the decentralised preparation of CMAPs. The model will be transparent and incorporate
community involvement and will define priorities that take into account social and economic
opportunity costs.
Activities for Output 2.1
Provide advice and guidance to the CROMAC staff for them to:
a.

Prepare a Work Plan for the duration of the project specifying target dates,
quantitative and qualitative achievement benchmarks for Immediate Objective 2.

b.

In conjunction with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), undertake a validation and the refinement, or amendment as necessary, of
the methodology adopted in the pilot Country Mine Action Priority Plan partially
completed under project CRO/00/001-Q01. The validation should occur not later than
July 2002 and express a view on the methodology applied in the use of social and
economic indicators as well as other criteria and the assignment of specific weights.

c

Prepare a manual or handbook in which the various steps of the process are
documented, with indications of responsibilities, as well as the methodological and
procedural steps required to update, monitor or adjust the CMAP.

d.

Identify individuals to be trained in the use of the model at all Regional Offices and
confirm that the institutional and managerial responsibilities for the preparation,
updating and operational use of the CMAP are well established.

e

Conduct workshops for the staff of all Regional Offices in preparation for utilising the
model in all mine affected counties within Croatia and involve identified individuals at
relevant ministries and county administrations to ensure that all parties understand
the connections between mine action, reconstruction, return and development and
the use of socio-economic factors in prioritisation.

f.

Collect data on development and re-integration projects in all mine affected counties
and information from Level 2 (Technical) and Level 3 (Completion) surveys and
improve the quality and use of socio-economic information within the Mine Action
Information System in the formulation of CMAPs.

g. Conduct monthly progress review meetings with UNDP.

Appendix 2: List of Indicators
Indicators
House yards
Roads
Agricultural land
Rivers
Low voltage network
Waterworks system
Telecommunication system
Power lines
Gas pipelines
Oil pipelines
Railway lines
National parks
Nature reserves
Tourist areas
Hunting areas
Flood prevention systems
Border belts
Forests
Fire fighting access routes
Return & safety of the population
Economic facilities

Measure
Square metres
Linear metres
Square meters
Linear metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Square metres
Square metres
Square metres
Square metres
Linear metres
Linear metres
Square metres
Linear metres
Numbers returning
Square metres

The following indicators were dropped as they only occurred in one
municipality.
Graveyards
Square metres
Border crossings
Linear metres
Collector
?
Army barracks
Square metres

Appendix 3: Benefits of Improved Priority-Setting
[will fill-in the explanation if it’s deemed worthwhile, but I have my doubts
that anything so conjectural is worthwhile.]

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Cost

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

Benefit
Benefit-Cost
Net Present Value

120,000
-

120,000
-

120,000
-

120,000
-

120,000
-

120,000
-

120,000
-

120,000
-

Cost

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

Benefit

205,714

205,714

171,429

102,857

102,857

68,571

51,429

51,429

Benefit-Cost

85,714

85,714

51,429

- 17,143

- 17,143

- 51,429

- 68,571

- 68,571

85,714

77,922

42,503

- 12,880

- 11,709

- 31,933

- 38,707

- 35,188

Cost

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

Benefit
Benefit-Cost
Net Present Value

120,000
-

120,000
-

205,714
85,714
70,838

205,714
85,714
64,398

102,857
- 17,143
- 11,709

102,857
- 17,143
- 10,644

51,429
- 68,571
- 38,707

51,429
- 68,571
- 35,188

Cost

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

120,000

Benefit

77,143
42,857
42,857

77,143

77,143

77,143

77,143

162,857

205,714

205,714

- 42,857

- 42,857

- 42,857

- 42,857

42,857

85,714

85,714

- 38,961

- 35,419

- 32,199

- 29,272

26,611

48,383

43,985

Totals

Baseline (1/3 each type)

-

Optimal

Net Present Value
Delayed optimal

75,723

38,989

Poor

Benefit-Cost
Net Present Value

- 59,729

